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ABSTRACT: It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they
will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In
this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of NelsonGoodman andW.V. Quine's which they
developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically
acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.
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1. The Argument from Logical Consequence
We do not have any strong convictions concerning the question of the existence or non-
existence of abstract objects. We do, however, believe that ontological fastidiousness is
prima facie a good attitude to adopt. More precisely, ontological parsimony provides a pro
tanto reason for theory choice. Nelson Goodman added to this fairly obvious principle
the methodological observation that a more parsimonious theory can always easily be
turned into a theory that is ontologically more lavish; and so a nominalistic theory can
be turned into a platonistic theory without any problem. There is, however, no guarantee
that the other way around is generally available Goodman (1977, p. L). So, hedging
your bets, it is advisable to resist an extravagant ontology for as long as possible. The
ontic extravaganza that Goodman zoomed in on was that of the calculus of classes,
or set theory as it is commonly known today. Nominalism for Goodman meant the
renunciation of classes, platonism their acceptance.
Goodman was certainly one of the most vocal defenders of nominalism in the last
century. Nowadays, the attempts he had made together with W.V. Quine to achieve a
nominalistic foundation of mathematics are often regarded as a complete failure. In a
very inuential synopsis of various nominalistic strategies, John P. Burgess and Gideon
Rosen write:
Goodman andQuine made it their priority to reconstrue the kind of science in whichmathematics
is applied, and especially the kind of mathematics applied in science. [...] After some modest initial
progress, the project of Goodman and Quine reached an impasse. (Burgess and Rosen 1997, p. 5)
[...] Quine, after the failure of his joint project with Goodman, soon came to reconsider, and
eventually came to recant, his nominalism. (Burgess and Rosen 1997, p. 32)
It seems to us that this underestimates Goodman and Quine's achievements.1 As we
hope to show in this paper, the strategy that Goodman developed together with Quine
1Moreover, Burgess and Rosen's claim in the second part of the quotation does not strike us as historically
correct regarding Quine's surrender to platonism.
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in their paper Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism Goodman and Quine (1947)
can aid closing one of the most problematic open gaps in contemporary nominalism.
This open gap concerns the notion of logical consequence as employed by nominal-
ists. It has been argued, on various grounds, that a nominalistically acceptable and at the
same time adequate explication of logical consequence is unobtainable. This objection
is usually raised against specic nominalistic programmes that aim to prove the dispens-
ability of any ontological commitment to abstract objects for science.2 Many nominalists
have to rely in their projects on logical consequence at some point. In the next section
we will briey sketch two cases.
Prima facie, logical consequence should be unproblematic for the nominalist. Logic,
of all things, should not carry any ontological commitments, let alone ontological com-
mitments to any dubious entities such as abstract objects. In fact, many philosophers of
logic believe that this is a mark of logicality. However, anti-nominalists have produced
the following Argument from Logical Consequence:
(P1) Without using the notion of logical consequence the nominalist cannot explain math-
ematical practice and its contribution to science.
(P2) Logical consequence can only be satisfactorily explicated with appeal to abstract
objects.
(P3) But logical consequence is a notion that stands in need of explication.
(C) The nominalist cannot explain mathematical practice and its contribution to
science.3
As we said, the reasoning behind premise (P1) will be explained in more detail
in the next section. (P2) and (P3) could be argued for as follows: One might begin by
arguing that themost inuential explication of logical consequence is themodel-theoretic
approach which goes back to the work of Alfred Tarski. This approach, however, makes
use of set theory and is thus committed to the existence of abstract objects. Alternative,
proof-theoretic explications also fail to be nominalistically acceptable, in that they employ
sets or sequences of sentences, which are abstract objects too see, e.g., Hale and Wright
(1992, p. 112). Indeed, sentences themselves are usually taken to be abstract objects:
types, say. This much should support (P2).
(P3) blocks themove just to assume the semantic consequence relation to be primitive
and therefore not in need of any explication. This move  which is in fact chosen by
some contemporary nominalists  is in conict with the epistemological motivation
that many nominalists had in the rst place. At least those nominalists who eschew
abstract objects because of their epistemology should not accept a mysterious and
inexplicable consequence relation either.
In this paper we aim to rebut this version of the Argument from Logical Conse-
quence. In section 3., we argue that one of the main assumptions which this argument
2 See, for instance, Hale and Wright (1992, 1994), Parsons (1990), Resnik (1983, 1985), Shapiro (1993,
1997).
3 A similar argument, called the argument from the philosophy of logic is made in Wilholt (2006), the
argument here is modeled after Wilholt's.
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rests on is mistaken. We argue for an explication of logical consequence along inferen-
tialist lines. We show how a consequence relation, so understood, can be explicated in a
nominalistically acceptable way, using the techniques developed by Goodman and Quine
in Goodman and Quine (1947). In the nal section we discuss the prospects for using
this explication of logical consequence in the two nominalistic programmes described
in the following section.
2. Two Nominalist Programmes
Nominalists, as we understand them, renounce classes, and a fortiori, objects which are
often considered to be constructed from them, such as numbers. Consequently, there
are three positions that nominalists can adopt with respect to statements of mathematics:
they can be regarded as true but not about numbers, sets or other mathematical objects;
or as strings of marks without meaning Goodman and Quine (1947, p. 111); or as
literally false Field (1980, p. 2 and passim). Nominalistic projects are usually concerned
with the reconstruction of the success of mathematical practice. As Goodman and Quine
expressed it, the challenge the nominalist has to face is to account for the fact that
mathematics can proceed with such remarkable agreement as to methods and results
Goodman and Quine (1947, p. 111). Moreover, mathematics apparently makes an im-
portant contribution to science, and the nominalist is challenged to account for this fact
too. In what follows, we will sketch two ways in which contemporary nominalists have
tried to give an account of mathematics, eliminative structuralism and ctionalism. We will
see that both accounts make use of the notion of logical consequence at crucial places.
2.1. Logical Consequence and Eliminative Structuralism
Structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics holds that (pure) mathematics is the
deductive study of structures as such. A nominalistic version of this view holds that
mathematics does not, in fact, make statements about any abstract objects that consti-
tute such structures (e.g., the natural numbers), but about whatever occupies the positions
in a natural number system, a system of objects that happens to instantiate the relations
that the realist assumes to be obtaining between the natural numbers. Accordingly, a
mathematical statement like
(M) 3 + 9 = 12
would be interpreted as
(M*) In any natural number system S, the object in the 3-place-of-S S-added to
the object in the 9-place-of-S results in the object in the 12-place-of-S. Shapiro
(1997, p. 85)
This way, the ontologically problematic statements of mathematics also come out nomi-
nalistically acceptable: `numbers exist' comes to `every natural number system has objects
in its places':
The programme of rephrasing mathematical statements as generalizations is a manifestation of
structuralism, but it is one that does not countenance structures, or mathematical objects for that
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matter, as bona de objects. Talk of numbers is convenient shorthand for talk about all systems
that exemplify the structure. Talk of structures generally is convenient shorthand for talk about
systems. (Shapiro 1997, p. 85)
Such an eliminative structuralism faces the problem of vacuity: in order to make sense
of large parts of mathematics, one seems forced to accept a rich background ontology,
and the nominalist just lacks the resources to provide one. To see how the problem arises,
consider ϕ to be a sentence in the language of arithmetic.4 Eliminative structuralism
understands ϕ as something of the form
(ϕ∗) For any system S, if S exemplies the natural number structure, then ϕ[S].
ϕ[S], here, is obtained from ϕ by interpreting the arithmetic terminology and the
variables in terms of the objects and relations of S. Let us assume that there are
only nitely many concrete objects. In this case, ϕ* comes out vacuously true, no
matter what ϕ is, since nothing exemplies the natural number structure. Accordingly,
an eliminative structuralist account of arithmetic will need to assume innitely many
objects in its background ontology, an eliminative structuralist account of Euclidean
geometry a background ontology of the cardinality of the continuum, etc.
There seem to be two ways for the nominalist to meet this challenge. One way
would be to assume that there are actual, concrete structures that can play the role of
the background ontology. At least for all cases of applied mathematics the nominalist
will need to hold that there is such an actual system that instantiates the mathematical
structures applied. The problem here seems to be that mathematical truth and falsity
will depend on contingent matters about the actual world, namely on whether there
are actual systems of objects that instantiate the mathematical structures. But does the
falsity of `All even numbers are prime' depend on whether or not there exist innite
totalities of concrete entities that constitute ω-sequences?5
It is not entirely clear how strong this counter-argument is. After all, the nominalist
typically feels forced to give an account for mathematics in the rst place, because of
the apparent usefulness of mathematics for science. But that mathematics is useful for
science could be considered a contingent matter, accordingly, the nominalist need only
explain why mathematics works, when it does. In a world with only a few objects, it
might be possible to use mathematical structures that only require a comparatively small
background ontology; in a nite universe, for instance, a mathematics of nite structures
might be all that is require for science.
A similar reply, that would bring us closer to the second way for the nominalist to
answer the problem of vacuity, could point out that also the platonist alternative will
assume that there are actually enough abstract objects to play the role of the background
ontology. Doesn't that make mathematical truth and falsity equally counterfactually
dependent on the existence of abstract objects? The difference is that platonist are
prepared to assume that their abstract objects exist necessarily, while the actual systems of
concrete entities of the nominalist exist only contingently.
4 The example is taken from Shapiro (1997, p. 85).
5 For a related worry see Wilholt (2006).
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But instead of assuming sufciently rich actual systems that might or might not exist,
depending on the way the world is, in order to instantiate the mathematical structures,
one could rephrase eliminative structuralism as a claim about possible systems, the
possibility of which depends on logic alone. Accordingly, our sentence of arithmetic ϕ
would be interpreted as saying
(ϕ∗∗) For any logically possible system S, if S exemplies the natural number structure,
then ϕ[S].
or as
(ϕ∗∗∗) Necessarily, for any system S, if S exemplies the natural number structure,
then ϕ[S].
Geoffrey Hellman (1989) carries out such a programme of modal eliminative struc-
turalism. Instead of assuming that there are actual systems that instantiate mathematical
structures, the modal eliminative structuralist would only assume that there are possible
systems that exemplify these structures  what could be ontologically less problematic?
Merely assuming that some systems are possible should not commit one to anything, or
so one might hope.
However, there is a problem: in order for his account to work, the modal eliminative
structuralist either needs an account of logical possibility or must assume that the notion
of logical possibility is primitive and not in need of further explication. The platonist
can challenge the latter assumption and claim that our grasp of the modal terminology
when applied to mathematics is too sophisticated to be considered primitive. It is rather
mysterious how we manage to use these notions the way we do if it was not for the fact
that they are themselves mathematically mediated:
When beginning students are rst told about logical possibility, logical consequence, etc., most
of them seem to have some idea of what is meant, but consider how much their initial intuitions
differ from our rened ones. The anti-realist owes us some account of how we plausibly could
come to understand the notions in question (as applied here) as we in fact do, independent of our
mathematics. Without this it is empty to use a word like primitive [...]. (Shapiro 1993, p. 475)
These worries concerning the involvement of modality might be silenced by pointing
out that logical possibility is unproblematic since it can be dened with recourse to logical
consequence or logical truth:ϕ is logically possible if and only if¬ϕ is not a logical truth.
(We assume that logical truth is dened as a degenerate case of logical consequence 
see section 3. for our concrete proposal.)
In this case, however, an account of logical consequence is needed that does not rely
on abstract objects, in the way that the model-theoretic explication does.
2.2. Logical Consequence and Fictionalism
In order to see that this problem not only arises for the modal eliminative structuralist,
we will briey sketch the problem as it arises for Hartry Field's ctionalism.
Field tries to defend nominalism against the objection thatmathematical objectsmust
exist to the best of our knowledge, by trying to undercut the platonist's Indispensability
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Argument. In particular, he tries to undercut the platonist's claim that mathematics is
indispensable for science, instead he attempts to show how science can be done without
numbers Field (1980, 1989).
The idea is the following: Field formulates part of physics  namely, Newtonian
mechanics  in a way that does not involve reference to any abstract objects. He
formulates this nominalistic theory N using a second-order mereology (at least in
one version of the programme). He then proves metatheoretically that a platonistic
extension of N , N + S, is conservative with respect to N : there are no nominalistically
statable consequences ofN + S that are not consequences ofN alone. In other words:
in deriving nominalistically statable conclusions, mathematics basically does the same as
logic. Logic might do it in a more long-winded fashion than mathematics, so the latter
has a practical use in making derivations shorter and more elegant, but any consequence
is also available without mathematics.
There are two places in which logical consequence seems to matter. First it seems
to matter when spelling out the second-order logic the nominalist wants to use to
accompany nominalized physics. Some have articulated the worry that the logic used
here might already undermine the nominalistic enterprise (e.g. Resnik (1985, p. 163)).
However, themore urgent problem seems to comewith the fact that the conservativeness
claim itself is formulated in terms of logical consequence:
[T]he ctionalist thesis of conservativeness is stated in terms of logical consequence, and the two
best historical explications of this are unavailable to the ctionalist. (Shapiro 1993, p. 461)
Again, Field assumes like Hellman that the notion of logical possibility can be taken
as a primitive Field (1991). Of course he must then face the same epistemological
challenges as the modal eliminative structuralist.
3. Logical Consequence without Models
3.1. Inferentialism
The most generally accepted explication of logical consequence is, no doubt, the model-
theoretic construal which goes back to the work of Alfred Tarski. Logical consequence
is, in the modern formulation, dened using set theory: a sentence ϕ is a logical con-
sequence of a set of sentences Γ if and only if ϕ is satised by all models that satisfy
all members of Γ. The models mentioned here are sets, and satisfaction is dened in
set-theoretic terms.
That this notion is not available to the nominalist has been remarked above, and this
point was raised by many authors, in particular in connection to Field's programme.6
There is another approach to logical consequence, however, that at least prima facie does
not involve nominalistically unpalatable notions, which goes back to the work of Gerhard
Gentzen (1935) and puts the logical inference rules in the centre of attention. In recent
times such approaches, which variably have been subsumed under the labels `inferen-
tialism' or `proof-theoretic semantics', have received considerable attention; prominent
6 In addition to Field himself, e.g. Field (1989, pp. 3031), see for instance Resnik (1983, 1985, 2), Hale
and Wright (1992, 1994), Shapiro (1983, 1993, 2), MacBride (1999, 4).
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proponents include Michael Dummett, Ian Hacking and Dag Prawitz.7 Inferentialism
insists that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by their introduction-
and elimination-rules, and that these rules (so far as they are the correct ones) are self-
justifying. No further appeal to model-theoretic semantics, truth-tables or the like is
needed in order to argue for the validity of the rules.
As is well known, conditional, negation, and universal quantication sufce to char-
acterise classical logic,8 so we will restrict our attention to these connectives. According
to the moderate inferentialism recommended here, logical consequence is characterised
by the following rules which can be added to any formal language that contains `⊃', `¬',
and `∀', and has appropriate syntactical categories for these rules to operate on:9
[ϕ]···
ψ ⊃I
ϕ ⊃ ψ
[ϕ]···
ψ
[ϕ]···¬ψ ¬ I¬ϕ
Φ(t) ∀ I∀xΦ(x)
ϕ ϕ ⊃ ψ ⊃E
ψ
¬¬ϕ ¬E
ϕ
∀xΦ(x) ∀E .
Φ(t)
The ∀ I-rule has the standard proviso that `t' does not occur free in Φ or in any of
the relevant assumptions. The square parentheses in ⊃I and ¬ I indicate that ϕ is an
assumption that is discharged by the application of these rules (thus, strictly speaking,
we have also the rule of assumption).10
Logical consequence is then explicated using these rules:
A sentence ϕ is a logical consequence of some premises Γ if and only if there is a
derivation of ϕ from Γ whose single lines are either sentences of Γ, result by
applications of the above rules from previous lines, or are assumptions that are
discharged by applications of ¬ I or ⊃I.
ϕ is a logical truth if and only it is thus derived using no undischarged premises.
The trouble with this denition is that it mentions notions that do not appear to be
readily available to the nominalist: sentence, line and derivation, which are usually taken
to be abstract types. If we want to spell out everything in detail, we will also have to
mention variables, terms, logical symbols, and more. Also, `Γ' looks suspiciously like the
7 See, e.g., Dummett (1973), Hacking (1979), Prawitz (1965, 1971, 1991), but also Milne (1994), Read
(2000), Wright (2007).
8 There is, of course, an issue concerning whether the logic should indeed be classical. This is, however,
assumed by Goodman and most contemporary nominalists and will not be discussed here. Needless
to say, inferentialism is not committed to classical rules of inference.
9 For simplicities sake, we will assume that no other logical axioms or rules are present for the language
in question prior to the introduction of these rules.
10 For more details see, for example, Prawitz (1965).
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name of a set. The denition has, hence, as of yet some signicant gaps that are still to
be lled in  in a nominalistically acceptable way. This problem will be addressed in
section 4.
3.2. Second-Order Logic
With this conception of logical consequence at hand (modulo the gaps that will be lled
in 4.), logical means more powerful than those provided by rst-order logic become
available. We can supplement our rules by a pair of rules for second-order quantiers.
Second-order logic allows generalisation into predicate-position in much the same way
that rst-order logic allows generalisation into name-position: with quantiers binding
variables that take the place of these expressions.11 As we will see in the nal section,
the adoption of second-order logic is crucial to several nominalistic projects. We will see
in 4., however, that the second-order quantier also comes in handy in our explication
of logical consequence, albeit without being strictly required.
The rule for the second-order quantiers we add are:
Φ(T ) ∀2 I∀XnΦ(Xn)
∀XnΦ(Xn) ∀2 E .
Φ(Ξ)
In ∀2 I, T is a n-place predicate letter or free variable that must not occur free in Φ
or any of the relevant assumptions. In ∀2 E, Ξ is an open sentence with n argument
places;12 no variables in Ξ are to be bound in Φ(Ξ) that are not already bound in Ξ.
For sure, second-order logic has attracted a profusion of criticism. Most prominent
amongst the complaints are incompleteness allegations, and Quine's famous claim that
second-order logic is nothing but set theory in sheep's clothing Quine (1970, pp. 66
68). The former complaint is usually framed thus: the non-axiomatisable consequence
relation of second-order logic on the standard model-theoretic conception is intractable
and does, hence, not qualify as logical consequence. We will content ourselves here
with the observation that the second-order consequence relation we are after is proof-
theoretic, and that therefore this intractability objection does not arise. This paper is not
the place for a more detailed discussion.13
11 For more details compare the current bible of second-order logic: Shapiro (1991). Shapiro favours the
model-theoretic conception of logic. For a proof-theoretic charactersation see, e.g., Prawitz (1965).
12 We allow instantiation with open sentences in this rule, rather than just predicate letters, in order
to gain the proof-theoretic strength of what, in axiomatic systems of second-order logic, is know
as the comprehension schema: ∃Xn∀〈x〉n(Xn〈x〉n ≡ Φ〈x〉n) (where `〈x〉n' abbreviates a string of
variables, `x1x2 . . . xn'). We bracket a discussion of comprehension here, and also dodge the issue
of quantication over functions which is usually included in a formulation of second-order logic.
For details see Shapiro (1991, 3.2). Although it is irrelevant here, the reader might be interested
in noting that n-place functions can be simulated by using (n + 1)-place predicates: the clause
p∀〈x〉n∃!y Fn+1〈x〉nyq indicates that pFn+1q is in effect an n-place function (where `∃!' stands
for the rst-order denable `there is exactly one').
13 Such a discussion can, however, be found in Rossberg (2004). The for the inferentialist more pressing
problem of a proof-theoretic notion of incompleteness is discussed in Rossberg (2006) and Wright
(2007).
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Quine's complaint about the set-theoretic commitment that second-order quanti-
cation allegedly brings about has been contested in various places, on various grounds.
To name but a few: George Boolos famously provided a plural interpretation of the
monadic second-order quantiers that dispenses with any commitment to sets and
which at least David Lewis found nominalistically acceptable.14 Crispin Wright argued
that second-order quantication cannot bring about new ontological commitment: if
predicates, as Quine contends for instance in Quine (1948), do not themselves carry any
ontological commitment to sets (or properties), then this commitment cannot suddenly
arise when one generalises into predicate position; much like rst-order quantication
does not suddenly bring about commitment to new objects when applied in a language
that contains non-referential terms.15 Even assuming that Quine is correct about the
ontological commitment of a theory being exhibited by the rst-order quantiers, there
does not appear to be any way of arguing from there that the second-order quantiers
bring about a commitment to sets.
Asmentioned above, the involvement of sets is obvious if amodel-theoretic approach
to logical consequence is chosen. This, however, is nothing peculiar to second-order logic
on this conception, but is the case for ordinary rst-order logic as well. But since we
here attempt to manage without model theory altogether, this problem does not arise
either. We thus leave the discussion at this stage in order to return to the question of the
signicant gaps that still remain in our explication of logical consequence.
4. Proofs and Tokens
4.1. Concatenation Theory
The problem of providing a nominalistically acceptable theory of syntax and proof-
theory for a formal language was tackled by Goodman and Quine in their joint paper
Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism using the Calculus of Individuals, developed
by Henry S. Leonard together with Goodman, and a theory of token-concatenation.16
Their effort has been found wanting due to a couple of limitations, which we aim to
overcome here.
14 Boolos (1984, 1985), Lewis (1991). The plural interpretation has subsequently been further developed,
see e.g. Rayo (2002), Rayo and Uzquiano (1999). Agustín Rayo and Stephen Yablo Rayo and Yablo
(2001) attempt to provide an interpretation of polyadic second-order quantication, roughly along
Boolos's lines and inspired by Arthur Prior's work Prior (1971, chapter 2). Peter Simons also draws
conclusions with respect to the debate about higher-order logic from Prior; see Simons (1993, 1997).
The plural interpretation itself has been found wanting in various respects  see, e.g., Linnebo (2003),
Resnik (1988) or Shapiro (1991, 9.1.1)  and is not further pursued for the purpose of the present
paper.
15 Wright (1983, pp. 132133), more recently again and in more detail in Wright (2007). Rayo and Yablo
(2001) suggest a similar principle.
16 Goodman and Quine (1947); see also Martin (1958) for a detailed study of token-concatenation theories
in this context. The Calculus of Individuals was published in Leonard and Goodman (1940); for a
study of its development see Rossberg (2009). An investigation into second-order versions of calculi
of individuals can be found in Niebergall (2009).
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To build a syntax for a formal language, we have to be able to say what a well-formed
formula  or (open) sentence  of this language is. To do this in a nominalistically
acceptable way, not only mention of sets has to be avoided, the sentences themselves
also have to turn out not to be abstract entities. Goodman and Quine suggest to make
sense of what a sentence is by identifying it with its concrete inscriptions. Marks on
paper, in instance, can be said to fall under a predicate `Fmla' (for well-formed formula).
In order to give a denition of this predicate, they start out with primitive predicates that
are true of concrete inscriptions if these have the familiar shape of the logical symbols,
variables, etc., and then build up the language in a way analogous to the common
recursive denition of a language that the platonist uses. To do so, they use a primitive
three-place predicate `C' which applies to token inscriptions. `C(x, y, z)' expresses that x
is a token inscription that is the concatenation of y and z. For convenience, we can dene
a four-place predicate `C(x, y, z, w)' as `∃t(C(x, y, t) ∧ C(t, z, w))', and analogously
for ve- and six-place predicates for concatenation (the number of terms following the
`C' will disambiguate which predicate it is).
But rst things rst. The primitive unary predicates we will be using are `Vee',
`UVee', `Ac', `LPar', `RPar', `Neg', `Cond', `UpsA', which are true of physical objects if
they have the shape of a lower case `v', and upper case `V ' (for use as rst- and second-
order variables, respectively), an accent `′', a left parenthesis `(', a right parenthesis, `)', a
negation sign, `¬', a conditional sign, `⊃', and an upside-down A, `∀', respectively.17
Let a character, `Char', be any of the things that the predicates above are true of
Goodman and Quine (1947, p. 113):
Char(x) =df Vee(x) ∨ UVee(x) ∨ Ac(x) ∨ LPar(x) ∨ RPar(x) ∨
Neg(x) ∨ Cond(x) ∨ UpsA(x).
And let an inscription, `Insc', be either a character, or a concatenation (note that con-
catenation was introduced as applying only to inscriptions  fully explicit, a recursive
denition would be in order):
Insc(x) =df Char(x) ∨ ∃y∃zC(x, y, z).
The rst thing we obviously need for the syntax is a sufcient supply of distinct
variables. These can be formed out of lower- and upper-case vees, concatenated with
strings of accents. For this, we can dene a string of accents as
AcString(x) =df Insc(x) ∧ ∀y((Part(x, y) ∧ Char(y)) ⊃ Ac(y)).
17 Goodman and Quine are more economic in their choice: the replace `¬' and `⊃' by the Sheffer stroke,
`|', for alternative denial, in terms of which the former two are denable; they also form the universal
quantier using parenthesis, `(v)', in lieu of `∀v', and do not have upper case variables. Since they
aim to provide a syntax for rst-order set theory, they have the additional `' for membership. There
might be concerns about left and right parentheses having the same shape, albeit rotated by 180◦. To
dissolve such worries, one could either appeal to the orientation of the inscription, or use a different
shape for one of the parenthesis, say, `]' instead of `)'. See Goodman and Quine (1947, p. 112).
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(Again, a recursive denition would have been possible that takes one accent as the base
case, and denes in the recursion step an accent-string to be any concatenation of accent
strings.) Note that `Part' is the the two-place predicate that is introduced and axiomatised
in the class-free subsystem of the Calculus of Individuals Leonard and Goodman (1940).
First- and second-order variable, `FVbl' and `SVbl', respectively, can thus be dened:
FVbl(x) =df Vee(x) ∨ ∃y∃z(Vee(y) ∧ AcString(z) ∧ C(x, y, z))
SVbl(x) =df UVee(x) ∨ ∃y∃z(UVee(y) ∧ AcString(z) ∧ C(x, y, z)).
That is, any lower-case vee, possibly followed by a string of accents, is a rst-order
variable, and any upper-case vee, possibly followed by a string of accents, is a second-
order variable.
Goodman and Quine go on to develop the syntax like this in a painstaking detail
which we will not go into here. They dene quantiers, (in our case an upside-down A
followed by a variable, orders distinguished by the order of the variable), atomic formulae,
and formulae. They then inscriptionally set up some logical axioms, which we, of course,
dispense with here. It follows the denition of a substitution, immediate consequence
(a formula that can be arrive at by one application of a rule), that of a line (of a proof),
and lastly a proof itself (as a list of lines all of which are immediate consequences of
previous lines or axioms). Since we allow for assumptions, our construction rst denes
a derivation as a list of lines all of which are immediate consequences of previous lines
or assumptions; a proof (of ϕ) will then be a derivation whose last line (ϕ) does not
depend on any undischarged assumption. A theorem, nally, is the last line of a proof.
These sketchy remarks on the construction must here sufce as a hint on the actual
construction. Goodman and Quine give their construction in full detail,18 and this is
easily amended to suit our proposal here if our hints above are followed. Note that we
have not included any constants in the language, neither names nor predicate constants.
Thus, all our formulae so far contain only variables and logical constants (`∀', `¬',
`⊃'). Identity is standardly dened in second-order logic (by Leibniz' Law), and other
constants can easily be introduced into the construction of the language.19
4.2. The Proof is Out There
If the notion of proof thus dened only encompassed discernible marks on paper, the
consequence relation dened with its help would be very restrictive. Goodman and
Quine, indeed, suggest that instead we take inscriptions to be any appropriately formed
portion of matter, whether it is against a contrasting background or not.
18 See Goodman and Quine (1947). Note that Goodman and Quine's denition D10 is defective, but easily
mended, as noted by Henkin in Henkin (1962, p. 192, fn. 3). See also Martin (1958).
19 Goodman and Quine mention in various passages of Goodman and Quine (1947) the problem they
have in dening the ancestral. Leon Henkin Henkin (1962) provides a solution; Goodman later states
Goodman (1972, p. 153) that the technique he developed himself in Goodman (1977, chapters IX and
X) will serve the purpose. Since we assume that the version of second-order logic presented here is
nominalistically acceptable, we can simply rely on Frege's original dention of the ancestral in Frege
(1879, 26).
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Then the only syntactical description that will fail to have inscriptions answering to them will be
those that describe inscriptions too long to t into the whole spatio-temporally extended universe.
This limitation is hardly likely to prove embarassing. (If we ever should be handicapped by gaps
in the proof of an inscription wanted as a theorem, however, we can strengthen our rules of
inference to bridge such gaps; for, the number of steps required in a proof depends on the rules,
and the rules we have adopted can be altered or supplemented considerably without violation of
nominalistic standards.) (Goodman and Quine 1947, p. 121)
We suggest the amendment to allow to count as inscriptions any appropriately
formed space-time region, whether it is occupied by matter or not. Let us also note
that even employing more and more abbreviations, other useful denitions and rules
other our primitive ones, in a nite universe, we will eventually run out of actual concrete
inscriptions, no matter how generously construed. We thus suggest to side with Field
Field (1980) and take it for granted that our universe is innite, and, in fact, contains
a continuum of space-time points (i.e., 2ℵ0-many); and we do not consider this as a
violation of nominalism20 until further notice. We discuss the innity of the universe
in this and other respects in the next section.
This generous conception of an inscription might seems objectionable to some, at
rst glance, since it means that all proofs are already out there  and quite literally
so. We literally discover proofs, that is, the space-time regions that are proofs, e.g. by
outlining the proof-shaped regions with a pencil (note, however, that this is not the only
way to learn that a proof exists). The initial feeling of offence will in most cases subside
when it is pointed out that the situation is exactly analogous for the platonist who takes
proofs to be abstract objects: types, for instance. These are also commonly assumed to
exist independently of anyone nding them (e.g. by tokening them). The only difference
is that the nominalist's proofs are concrete objects. In principle, it should thus also be
possible to use nominalistic analogues of any way of demonstrating the existence of a
proof that the platonist uses. Next to transcribing it, there is, for example, proving that
the inscription must exist. (This proof will be an inscription again, but it need not be the
proof whose existence is thus demonstrated.)
Rejecting the generous conception of an inscription, and thus not only denying an
actual innity of proofs, but also the existence of proofs that have not been written
down, would mean to adopt a position even more radical than Goodman's nominalism.
It seems that Stanisªaw Le±niewski embraced this very restrictive conception of proof
see Simons (2002), which not only entails that proofs come into existence when they are
rst written down, but also that they cease to exist when the last inscription (narrowly
construed) is destroyed. Irrespective of how appealing this position is, it does not appear
that a criticism along these lines could coherently be put forward by the platonist.
In our innite universe there are thus innitely many concrete proof-inscriptions
(understood in the generous way specied above). Moreover, there are enough in the
sense that there are all the proofs that a platonistic version of inferentialism accounts
for. Our explication of logical consequence is thus co-extensive with the platonistic
inferentialist account of logical consequence.
20 This, to be sure, has been contested; see, e.g., MacBride (1999).
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5. Is this Enough? (Or is it too much?)
With the help of concatenation theory, an inferentialist conception of logical conse-
quence, and speculations about the size of the actual universe, we arrived at an explication
of logical consequence that might seem nominalistically acceptable. Whether it indeed is
nominalistically acceptable is a question that does not allow for a straightforward answer.
First of all, nominalists might disagree with one another about what resources in fact
count as nominalistically acceptable.
Further, they might disagree on what an explication is supposed to do, and, in
particular, disagree about the relation in which explicatum and explicandum must stand
to each other, in order for an explication to be adequate.
Finally, they might disagree about the use they want to make of the explicatum in
their theories. We mentioned two nominalist programmes above and said what role the
notion of logical consequence plays in their projects. Below, we will address the question
to what extend the explication of logical consequence suggested here can be used in these
projects. Space constraints will not allow us to pursue all these questions in sufcient
detail.
5.1. A Ballet Dancing Brick Layer
Let us rst turn to the assumptions we made about the size of the universe. To be on
the safe side, we assumed that our universe is large enough to contain the inscriptions
of all proofs the platonist assumes to exist. But does the assumed size of the universe
not sin against the nominalist's standards and put everything in jeopardy that we have
achieved so far? Some anti-nominalists have questioned our assumption that space-
time points could be considered nominalistically acceptable, since they believe that
the presumed mark of the concrete (having causal powers) is merely metaphorically
instantiated by space-time points e.g. Resnik (1985), MacBride (1999). We will not go
into this discussion here, and simply assume that if a nominalist (like Hartry Field) nds
space-times points ultimately acceptable, then so be it. But we want to claim that our
explication of logical consequence would also be acceptable for Goodman. Would he
have accepted an assumption of uncountably many points of physical space-time?
Remembering Goodman's early paper with Quine, one might think that he would
not have accepted such an assumption. The project by Goodman and Quine was not
only nominalist, it was also nitist:
We decline to assume that there are innitely many objects. Not only is our own experience nite,
but there is no general agreement among physicists that there are more than nitely many objects
in all space-time. If in fact the concrete world is nite, acceptance of any theory that presupposes
innity would require us to assume that in addition to the concrete objects, nite in number, there
are also abstract entities. (Goodman and Quine 1947, p. 106)
Goodman and Quine's project descended from their joint efforts with Alfred Tarski
and Rudolf Carnap in the early 1940s to develop the foundations of arithmetic in a way
that respects nitism (there is only a nite number of individuals), physicalism/reism
(there are only physical things), and nominalism (there are only variables for individuals,
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not for universals).21 The motivations for this project were already at that time rather
heterogeneous. Tarski claimed not to understand languages that do not satisfy these
conditions, thus citing an epistemic reason for these constraints. However, he apparently
also thought that nitism is just a consequence of there being only nitely many objects
in the world.
Carnap, on the other hand, shared Tarski's insistence on nitism only to a certain
degree. Insofar as he was motivated to require nitism for the foundations of arithmetic,
his motivation was empiricist: since each conrmation is based on nite observations,
our knowledge is limited to the nite (independent of how many objects the world
contains). But Carnap also claimed to understand innite conceptions of arithmetic,
making sense of them in terms of what we characterized above as modal eliminative
structuralism:
It seems to me that I actually understand, in a certain degree, innite arithmetic [...]. To the
question of Tarski and Quine, how I interpret this, when the number of things is perhaps nite:
I do not know exactly but perhaps through mere positions instead of things [...]. A position is an
ordering possibility for a thing. I do not have the intuitive rejection of the concept of possibility
as Tarski and Quine do. (Carnap's notes on the discussions with Tarski and Quine, RC-090-16-25,
Carnap Archives Pittsburgh, as cited in (Mancosu 2005, p. 344))
As Goodman and Quine report in the beginning of their 1947 paper, the discussion
in the early 40s did not lead to a nal solution. Goodman and Quine had a new idea
though how to address the problem. Instead of trying to formulate arithmetic with nitely
many objects, platonist mathematics was simply treated as a meaningless language that
did not require any interpretation in terms of acceptable objects. Instead, they went
meta-mathematical: they devised a nominalistically acceptable way to speak about the
way that platonist mathematics, considered as a mere apparatus, can work. Since this
way of doing meta-mathematics did not involve notions of arithmetic, the problem of
interpreting the numbers as concrete objects, which had bothered Carnap and Tarski,
did not reoccur for their proposal.
Finitism is however not fully unproblematic for an inscriptionist account. Above we
assumed  to be on the safe side  that the universe should comprise an uncountable
number of space-time points in order to allow for inscriptions of proofs of arbitrary
length. Goodman and Quine believed that such an assumption is not needed, as quoted
above, since stronger rules and auxiliary denitions could be introduced.
As we said above, it is not clear that this move can help in all cases. Many authors
have pointed out, however, that the nominalist is free to chose other ressources. Michael
Resnik straightforwardly suggests that in order to develop a nominalistically acceptable
meta-mathematics that is workable, the nominalist has to assume an innite universe. A
Fieldian conception of space-time would help providing one:
If we followed Field we would nd it much easier to develop a nominalistic syntax than did Quine
and Goodman, because we nd an innitude of inscriptions in his already posited continuous
space-time. (Resnik 1983, p. 518)
21 Cf. Mancosu (2005).
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Also Henkin (1962) admits that Goodman and Quine need not make any assump-
tions regarding nitism for their nominalistic project. Goodman, in particular, was pre-
pared to divorce nominalism from nitism. In A World of Individuals (Goodman
(1956), reprinted in Goodman (1972)) Goodman pointed out that nominalism is not
logically connected to nitism:
The nominalist is unlikely to be a nonnitist only inmuch the sameway a bricklayer is unlikely to be
a ballet dancer. The two things are at most incongruous, not incompatible. Obviously by the stated
criterion for nominalism [essentially, the rejection of classes], some systems with innite ontologies
are nominalistic, and some systems with nite ontologies are platonistic. (Goodman 1972, p. 166)
And later, in Problems and Projects Goodman (1972) he clearly seems to be ready to
give up nitism for the sake of nominalism, in response to Alonzo Church's challenges
to Goodman and Quine's nitistic syntax:
In the rst place, I should point out that this letter [by Alonzo Church, in which Church lists
tasks that he thinks the nitist still has to accomplish] predated A World of Individuals, where
nominalism is carefully distinguished from nitism. Our position in Steps was indeed ntistic
as well as nominalistic; but nitism, although a friendly companion of nominalism, is neither
identical with nor necessary to it. (Goodman 1972, p. 154)
We thus content ourselves with the fact that Goodman would have found the
assumption of an innite universe nominalistically acceptable.22
However, there remains a problem: the assumption made about the size of the
universe was introduced as an empirical hypothesis about the actual world. We usually
assume such hypotheses to be contingently true, if true at all. This, however, appears to
conict with the very nature of logic. Logical consequence is usually assumed to be a
matter of necessity. How can a contingent assumption serve as its foundation?
5.2. The Size of the Universe and Logical Consequence
Three problems need to be distinguished here. The rst concerns a vague feeling, the
second and third can be put forward in a precise way.
There might be a vague and uncomfortable feeling arising, given our explication of
logical consequence, that the size of the universe, or the existence of some peculiarly
shaped space-time regions, just should have nothing to do, generally speaking, with what
follows logically from what. Vague worries are difcult to address, but here are some
remarks which might help, at least, to get into the spirit.
First, a semi-technical point: the explication of logical consequence only indirectly
depends on the size of the universe. The consequence relation is pinned down by the
inferentialist proposal: what follows from what is determined by the inference rules. The
trouble only arises in the metatheory when an explicit denition of logical consequence
is asked for. There, logical consequence is dened as a certain relation. A relation
requires relata, and for the nominalist nothing but concrete things can serve as such.
The explication of a sentence, or, more generally, the provision of a nominalistically
acceptable syntax, primarily involves the worrisome sentence tokens. But if innitely
22 Compare also Goodman's brief remark on Field in Goodman (1984, p. 53).
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many sentences are indeed needed, and sentences are concrete objects, then there will
have to be innitely many concrete things.
Further, the nominalistmight ask backwhat the opponent expected a nominalistically
acceptable denition to look like. Obviously, it will only mention concrete entities, what
else could it do? These are the only entities that nominalists allow themselves, after
all. Note, however, that no cunning coding tricks are used in our proposal here which
are employed elsewhere, in order to achieve arguably nominalistic reconstructions of
mathematics. Let us emphasise that, rather than assuming a large enough ontology to
allow for the interpretation of some mathematical notion,23 the proposal here is in exact
correspondence with the actual practice of proof (or, rather, the idealised version of
it that is commonly assumed in the discussion of logical consequence). The ontology
here assumed, concrete inscriptions of proofs, is precisely the gold standard of proof in
logical and mathematical practice: the provision of a written down version of a proof to
demonstrate that the inference holds. The explication of logical consequence presented
here thus comes with an epistemology already attached. This was one of the motivations
for the project in the rst place.
The rst precisely formulated problem concerns the counterfactual dependence of
the extension of logical consequence given our proposal on the size of the universe.
Let us here take for granted that the actual universe is innite and thus big enough for
the nominalist denition of logical consequence to be extensionally equivalent to the
platonist inferentialist conception of logical consequence. The dependence on actual
inscriptions makes logical consequence nevertheless counterfactually dependent on the
size of the universe: suppose there is a possible nite universe and that there is some
proof inscription that uses up all space-time in that universe. Say the last line of this
proof, the consequence of the argument, is ψ, and one of the premises it rests on is ϕ,
then it seems that the nominalist would be forced to say, that pϕ ⊃ ψq is not a logical
consequence of the rest of the premises that ψ was originally derived from. The rule for
⊃-introduction, also know as conditional proof, would of course licence the inference, but
since we ran out of space-time, this inference cannot be drawn.24 We would be forced
to say that in this universe, pϕ ⊃ ψq is not a logical consequence of the premises, while
in our (innite) universe it is. But, surely, the size of the universe should not matter for
the question, what follows from what.25
Goodman, we think, would not have considered this objection to be seriously
damaging. His meta-philosophical conception of explications would have counted the
explication we arrived at as adequate, since extensional equivalence is sufcient for
this purpose. Indeed, Goodman is famous for insisting that even co-extensionality
is too strong a requirement for adequacy of explications Goodman (1977, pp. 322).
Goodman's weak requirements for adequate explications are certainly met by the account
23 As, e.g., in Lewis (1991) or Niebergall (2005).
24 This, in effect, amounts to Alonzo Church's demand, that the inscriptional account suggested by
Goodman and Quine would have to be able, inter alia, to sustain the deduction theorem. The letter
in which Church raises this criticism is published in Goodman (1972, pp. 153154), alongside with
Goodman's dismissive response.
25 See Wilholt (2006, pp. 122123) for a related worry.
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proposed here. Thus we have at least an account of logical consequence before us that
would have satised Goodman.
But there is the second problem which questions whether the the actual universe
is, in fact, innite and thus big enough for the nominalist denition of logical conse-
quence to be extensionally equivalent to the platonist inferentialist conception of logical
consequence.26 Suppose the above derivation described again. If the universe turns out
to be nite so that there is not enough space-time for an actual concrete derivation of
pϕ ⊃ ψq. In this case, pϕ ⊃ ψq is actually not a logical consequence of the relevant
premises, despite the fact that the rule of conditional proof would licences the inference
if only the universe was bigger.
Besides biting the bullet and admitting that pϕ ⊃ ψq does, in this case, not actually
follow from the relevant premises, we can see three strategies that nominalists of different
temperaments might adopt to avoid this problem.
If we are happy to allow ourselves modal notions, we could amend the proposal
to let logical consequence be a relation between possible concrete sentence tokens. The
nominalist could point out that the modality required for this treatment does not fall
foul of the common obscurity objections with which modal notions are traditionally
attributed. No vague speculation or guesswork is required to work out how the relation
will extend beyond the actual universe. Our schematic rules determine this extension
precisely. A slightly bigger universe would contain no surprises as to what follows from
what. We merely have more inscriptions there that look exactly the same, only that some
are longer, and behave in exactly the same way as the actual inscriptions do.
The case would, indeed, be much like the following. Imagine a mathematician who
runs out of paper while scribbling down a certain proof just before she can write down
the conclusion of the proof (which is an application of conditional proof). It would be
madness to claim that, owing to the lack of paper and the resulting lack of the last line,
there is no telling how the concrete inscription of the proof would go on, or that it is
obscure to say that it is possible to extend the proof. It is perfectly obvious how the proof
would continue if she had another sheet of paper. It does not matter for this purpose
whether she actually bothers to get another sheet. It would also make no difference if
there happened to be no more paper in the universe at all, or, indeed, anything else to
write on. Obviously, the conclusion follows, whether our mathematician nds another
sheet of paper or not, whether there exists any more paper in the universe or nor, or
whether there is enough space-time for the last line or not. But this unproblematic
notion of possibility is all that is needed in the modal version of the explication of
logical consequence.
Further, this strategy has a variant: instead of quantifying over possible sentence
tokens in the denition of logical consequence, one could employ a constructibility operator
akin to that which Charles Chihara introduced in his nominalistic programme Chihara
(1990). Logical consequence would not be a relation between possible sentence tokens,
but between constructible sentence tokens, where `constructible' is obviously not to be
26 Note that it would be sufcient if any aspect of the (concrete) physical universe were innite for a similar
construction to go through. Thus, the case described here involves that nothing physical is innite or
innitely divisible: not just space, but also time, electromagnetic force, wave-length, gravity, etc.
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analysed as `possible to construct'  otherwise this variant would be no more than
a complication of the modal strategy above. What is constructible, again, would have
to take us beyond what actually can be constructed given the nite cardinality of the
universe that we here assume.
Lastly, a counterfactual approach could be taken. Counterfactuals should again best
not be taken as to be reduced to possibility in order to not merely complicate the modal
proposal, and there are reasons to refrain from such attempts in any case.27 If, for
instance, a Stalnaker-Lewis-style analysis of counterfactuals was given, one would end
up not only with a yet to be explained notion of possibility (or possible world), but also
in want of an explication of the similarity (or closeness) relations which analyses of this
ilk require in addition. The denition of logical consequence on this account would thus
still be in terms of a relation between concrete sentence tokens; it would, however, state
something like: a sentence ϕ is a logical consequence of some premises Γ if and only if, if
the universe were large enough to contain the required inscriptions, there would be a
derivation of ϕ from Γ whose single lines are either sentences of Γ, etc.
These three proposals contain notions  possibility, constructiblity, counterfactual
 which themselves are in want of explanation. If any of the three is adopted, one
would have to let go of the hope to dene it in terms of logical consequence, on pain
of vicious circularity. This might seem a high price to pay. On the other hand, perhaps
the techniques suggested here could be utilised for such explications. Attempting this is
beyond the scope of this paper, but the beginning of an explication of possibility along
the lines suggested here might be made using the inferentialist account of modality.28
In what follows, we discuss these proposals in relation to the above mentioned
nominalistic projects.
5.3. Two Nominalist Programmes Revisited
It seems that, although the notion of logical consequence is available to the nominalist,
there will still remain open problems in the nominalistic programmes that we have
introduced above. Let us rst discuss the problem as it arises for ctionalism, and then
turn to the problem that seems to remain for modal eliminative structuralism.
As we have said, Field wants to prove the conservativeness of mathematics, in order
to show that mathematics is  despite being a useful tool for shortening derivations
 dispensable for the derivation of physical consequences from physical theory. It
seems obvious that Field cannot establish the relevant conservativeness result using the
explication of logical consequence provided here. As Stewart Shapiro Shapiro (1983)
has shown, one can formulate a Gödel sentence, G, in the nominalistic language, such
that G is not provable in the nominalistic theory N , but provable (via Field's bridge
principles) in N + S, where S is, e.g., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. According to our
analysis, mathematics is thus not conservative over nominalistic physics: there are logical
consequences of N + S, formulated in the nominalistic language, that are not logical
consequences of N , in the explicated sense of logical consequence.
27 In fact, TimothyWilliamson has recently suggest to do it the other way around: to analyse modal notions
in terms of counterfactuals; see Williamson (2005).
28 See for instance Prawitz (1965) and Read (2008).
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For Hellman's project, things do not seem to be much better. First of all, explicating
the notion of possibility that modal eliminative structuralism assumes in terms of logical
consequence won't help if modal notions are essential for the explication of logical
consequence (cf. the previous section). By this variant of the explication we would be
led back in a full circle.
Taking either the counterfactual option or the proposal involving the notion of
constructibility, the circularity worry does not arise (at least not initially), but what we
have achieved is to patch up an account that was found wanting because it used an
unexplained notion of logical possibility by using a further unexplained notion. This is
little progress, if progress at all.
As we indicated above, if the nominalist accepts Goodmanian standards for the
adequacy of explications, this problem might not arise, since in that case no notion of
possibility needs to be assumed for the explication of logical consequence. However,
the rich actual system of space-time could directly be put to use as an instantiation of all
structures that a structuralist should29 be interested in. If there is no reason to be a modal
eliminativist in the case of logical consequence, there surely does not seem to be such
a reason in the case of mathematics. Thus, while logical consequence on this variant of
the explication might help the structuralist nominalist, it at the same time seems wholly
superuous.
A platonist might also sense a problem if  as in the case of Hellman's original
proposal the logic is assumed to be second-order. In this case, there will be a sentence,
G, formulated exclusively in (second-order) logical vocabulary, such thatG is not a logical
truth of second-order logic, but a logical truth of third-order logic.30 `Logical truth' is
here used in the inferentialist sense, such that something is a logical truth if it is a
logical consequence of the empty set of premises, i.e. (in nominalistic terms) if there
is a derivation-inscription of an inscription of that sentence that accords to the rules
and contains no undischarged assumptions. We can call this the non-conservativeness of
third-over second-order logic.31
The objection might be formulated thus: although G is not a logical truth (of
second-order logic), it is nevertheless not the case that 3¬G, since ¬G is ruled out by
third-order logic. G is a theorem of third-order logic, and thus 2G, i.e. ¬3¬G.
It seems, however, that this problem might be surmountable with an amendment in
the notion of possibility. There are two options that come to mind. First, one could be
a relativist about logical possibility, second, one could be a minimalist about this notion.
According to relativism, ¬G is not logically impossible simpliciter, but logically pos-
sible relative to second-order logic and logically impossible relative to third-order logic,
29 If we assume that the structuralist is interested in making sense of mathematics as it is put to use in the
sciences.
30 Third-order logic is the next step up in an innite hierarchy of n-th order logics, that is in many ways
similar to the hierarchy of simple type theory. Second-level predicates are introduced to apply to
the ordinary predicates of rst- and second-order logic which are now called rst-level predicates.
Third-order variables stand in the place of second-level predicates in the same way that second-order
variables stand in the place of rst-level, i.e. ordinary predicates. Third-order quantiers bind these.
31 For a proof and discussion of the non-conservativeness of third- over second-order logic see Rossberg
(2006); the proof is based on a result of Leivant (1994, 3.7).
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becauseG is a theorem of third-order logic, but no theorem of second-order logic. Since
G contains only second-order vocabulary, this move seems only promising if we assume
that logical consequence and logical truth (and a fortiori the meaning of a sentence con-
taining logical vocabulary), also in case of sentences that use only a restricted selection of
logical vocabulary, is always determined holistically by all introduction and elimination
rules of a given logic. Since G is a sentence of two different logics (second-order and
third-order logic), it thus can be a logical truth in one, while failing to be a logical truth
in the other.
Onemight also attempt to surmount the problem by being a minimalist about logical
possibility, such that some sentence S counts as a logical possibility simpliciter only if
there is no logic in the hierarchy of (n-th)-order logics (or maybe an even wider range
of logics), such that ¬S would be a logical truth in that logic (and, accordingly, some
sentence T is a logical truth simpliciter if it is a logical truth of some logic). This paper is
not the place to discuss these options in any detail, but note that CrispinWright suggests,
for related reasons, introducing the quantiers of all orders up toω (and possibly beyond)
at once.32
That we have no better news for nominalistic programmes hardly is the fault of the
notion of logical consequence. If logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable
conception is less powerful than the platonist notion, then this merely means that there
is work yet to be done for the nominalist, but not that they should resign themselves to
relying on platonistic smoke-screens.
If logical consequence turns out to be insufcient to explicate some notion that
a particular nominalist project requires, then the task will have to be done with the
assistance of other nominalistically acceptable means. Using, on the other hand, a notion
of logical possibility as an inexplicable primitive seems to have the same advantages as
theft over honest toil.33
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